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Damages for a Temporary Regulatory Taking:
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.




The "taking"'- issue arising from regulatory2 land-use control
has gained new prominence in the 1980s.3 Generally, the issue has
been whether government land-use regulations can give rise to
compensable "takings" within the meaning of the fifth amend-
ment.4 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v.
County of Los Angeles5 represents the sixth time6 in this decade
* Deputy City Attorney, City of San Diego, 1983-present. J.D., California West-
ern School of Law, 1982. B.A., State University of New York at Albany, 1978.
** Second year student, California Western School of Law.
1. The word "taking" is a colloquailism for eminent domain. For a detailed analy-
sis of the taking issue, see Bauman, The Supreme Court, Inverse Condemnation and the
Fifth Amendment: Justice Brennan Confronts the Inevitable In Land Use Controls, 15
RUTGERS L.J. 15 (1983). "[A] taking is not simply synonymous with eminent domain....
A taking is that which takes, whether by condemnation, physical invasion, regulation or
any other stringent exercise of state power." Id. at 50. Mr. Bauman, Litigation Counsel,
National Association of Home Builders, Washington, D.C., filed amicus curiae briefs on
behalf of N.A.H.B. and in support of appellant in First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987); San Diego Gas &
Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); and Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447
U.S. 225 (1980). Mr. Bauman was of Counsel on Supreme Court brief for appellant Mac-
Donald, Sommer & Frates in MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct.
2561 (1986).
2. Taking claims are termed "regulatory takings" when a landowner alleges that
government action so restricts the permissible use to which his land can be put that the
land is deprived of all or substantially all of its value and has, in effect, been taken from
the landowner. F. SCHNIDMAN, S. ABRAMS & J. DELANEY, HANDLING THE LAND USE CASE
519 (1984). In this article, the term regulatory taking is used as it has derived from case
law and shall include any government act that deprives a landowner of all or substantially
all of the value of the land subject to the governmental act thereby giving rise to protection
under the taking clause of the fifth amendment.
3. "First, the taking issue is one of the most fundamental issues concerning indi-
vidual rights and government power. Second, the Supreme Court keeps accepting taking
cases and then avoiding the issue." 1986 ZONING AND PLANNING LAW HANDBOOK 66 (B.
Gailey ed. 1986).
4. The fifth amendment provides that private property shall not "be taken for pub-
lic use without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
5. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
6. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedicts, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987); Mac-
Donald, Sommer & Frates, 106 S. Ct. 2561; Williamson County Reg. Plan Comm'n v.
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 450 U.S. 621; Agins,
447 U.S. 225.
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the Supreme Court has granted review to determine whether a
monetary remedy is available for regulatory takings. In the cases
that preceded First English, the Court was unable to rule on the
remedy issue because the pleadings left preliminary questions un-
answered, or the judgment was not deemed final.'
Unlike earlier cases reviewed by the Court, First English has
provided an answer to the remedy question. In First English, the
Court, by a six to three vote,8 ruled that property owners must be
compensated when land-use regulations deprive them, even tempo-
rarily, of all use of their property.'
This article examines the impact of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in First English on government land-use regulations and
property owners. First, it presents an overview of the regulatory
taking issue, including recent Supreme Court responses. Second, it
reviews the history of First English. Although some concepts and
analyses are extracted from other decisions of the same term, this
article concentrates on the remedy issue, both from a procedural
and substantive prospective. Third, this article discusses the
Court's reasoning in the majority and dissenting opinions of First
English. Finally, this article analyses the Court's decision in rela-
tion to the future of land-use regulations, the exercise of the police
power1 ° and how First English will affect litigation processes for
municipal activities."
I. TAKING AND THE "POLICE POWER"
The property clauses of the fifth1 2 and fourteenth 3 amendments
prohibit both the federal government and the individual states
7. See supra note 6. In Agins, the Court did not reach the question because it
ruled that the challenged municipal activities did not constitute a taking. In San Diego
Gas, the Court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over the controversy. In William-
son and MacDonald, the Court held the claims to be premature as the antecedent question
of whether the property was taken had not been decided.
8. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, and was joined by
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Powell and Scalia. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting
opinion joined in parts II, Ill and IV by Justices Blackmun and O'Connor. First English,
107 S. Ct. at 2381.
9. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2389.
10. The police power is the broadest of governmental powers as it affects the peace,
order, health, morals, convenience, comfort and safety of citizens. The police power estab-
lishes social order, protects life and health of persons, secures and safeguards the enjoy-
ment and beneficial use of property. 6 E. MCQUILLIN. THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORA-
TIONS § 24.04 (3d ed. 1980).
1i. In his dissent, Justice Stevens warned that the majority's decision will ignite a
"litigation explosion." First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2400 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
12. See supra note 4. "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
13. "No state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
[Vol. 24
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REGULATORY TAKING
from depriving a person of property without due process of law.
Additionally, government is prohibited from taking private prop-
erty for public use without the payment of "just compensation."' 4
Courts have prohibited government "from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens, which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole."' 5 In other words, since
the general public benefits from regulation affecting property, the
general public, through government, should bear the cost in favor
of the affected property owners."6
A taking of private property for public use may be accom-
plished in one of three ways. First, a taking may be a direct physi-
cal invasion which typically occurs when government exercises its
power of eminent domain.' 7 Second, a taking may be an indirect
invasion which occurs when government exercises its police power
in an unduly restrictive or improper manner.' 8 Third, an indirect
taking may occur when, as a result of a public improvement pro-
ject, damage to nearby property occurs.
While at first glance the distinction between the power of emi-
nent domain and the police power may not be apparent, the power
are separate and distinct. The power of eminent domain is a pre-
existing federal and state power that authorizes the taking of pri-
vate property for public use.' 9 The power is limited by the fifth
amendment, so that property may only be taken upon the pay-
ment of just compensation.20 Municipalities, however, have no in-
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
14. See supra note 12.
15. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S 40 (1960).
16. The restraints placed on government by the fifth and fourteenth amendments
have been defined by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393
(1922), as providing "an average reciprocity of advantage," The Court in Penn Cent.
Transportation v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 140 (1978), found that an average reci-
procity of advantage was established when "[a]ll property owners in a designated area are
placed under the same restrictions, not only for the benefit of the municipality as a whole
but for the common benefit of one another."
17. Eminent domain is the power of the government to take property for public use
without the owner's consent upon making just compensation. 1 NICHOLS, ON EMINENT
DOMAIN § 1.11 (3d ed. 1985). In California, see the eminent domain law, CAL CIv. PROC.
CODE §§ 1230.010-1273.010 (Deering 1981 & Supp. 1987).
18. "The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). See supra note 2.
19. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875).
20. The Supreme Court originally construed the fifth amendment as applicable only
to the federal government and not to the states. See Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. 84
(1857). The fifth amendment was held to be applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment by the Supreme Court in Chicago B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,
241 (1897). Since the Constitution of the United States did not expressly confer the power
of eminent domain upon the federal government, the power to take property for federal
1988]
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herent power to acquire private property by the power of eminent
domain. Rather, such authority must be expressly conferred by
the state.2'
The police power is an inherent attribute of state authority
which is essential for the effective conduct and maintenance of
government. 22 The police power refers to the government's power
to enact laws, within consitutional limits to protect the public
health, safety, morals and general welfare.23 The police power,
like the power of eminent domain, is not inherent to municipali-
ties. It may be either expressly or impliedly conferred by the
state.24 An effect of the police power, therefore, is to restrict prop-
erty rights that are harmful, while the power of eminent domain
appropriates useful property rights for public use.25
A. Constitutional Roots of Taking and Just Compensation
The constitutional limitations on governmental power found in
the fifth and fourteenth amendments can be traced back to the
Magna Carta of 1215.26 The English document provided, "[n]o
freeman shall be . . .deprived of his freehold . . . unless by the
lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the land. '27 The
English monarchs did not hold the property rights provided for in
the Magna Carta with high esteem.28 As a result, the English
public purposes has been implied under the necessary and proper clause. This implication is
carried on to the extent necessary to support federal government programs while taking
into account the fifth amendment's mandate that private property may not be taken for
public use without just compensation.
21. 11 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 32.11 (3d ed.
1983). Municipalities do not possess inherent authority to take private property by eminent
domain. Such authority is expressly delegated to them by the State. Municipalities and
local entities exercise, therefore, the state's power of the eminent domain. CAL. CONST. art.
I § 19; CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE §§ 1235.150, 1235.190 (Deering 1981 & Supp. 1987); Char-
ter of the City of San Diego, art. XIV § 220.
22. 6 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 24.02 (3d ed.
1980).
23. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876). See supra note 10.
24. The Authors acknowledge that this is certainly a simplification of the delegation
of the police power. See 6 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §
24.37-24.38 (3d ed. 1980).
25. I1 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 32.04 (3d ed.
1983).
26. The Magna Carta of England was granted by King John at Runnymede, June
15, 1215, to limit the arbitrary power of the King. SMITH. THE CONSTITUTION, A Docu-
MENTARY AND NARRATIVE HISTORY 19-20 (1978).
27. "The clause is sometimes called Article 39 because the original 1215 Magna
Carta contained 63 articles, of which the above was 39. By 1225, the Charter consisted of
37 Articles as the original 63 were pared down and consolidated of which the aforemen-
tioned was number 29." F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 56
(1973) [hereinafter cited as THE TAKING ISSUE].
28. For a more complete history, see THE TAKING ISSUE, supra note 27, at 53-81.
4
California Western Law Review, Vol. 24 [2015], No. 1, Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol24/iss1/4
REGULATORY TAKING
were often deprived of those rights.29 Yet, they nevertheless
brought the idea with them to America at the time of
colonization.
In the American colonies, powers of eminent domain were regu-
larly employed for roads and other transportation projects.3" Often
colonial statutes authorized the taking of private property for
these ventures, and compensation was provided when developed or
enclosed land was taken.31 Colonial legislatures included taking
provisions in their state constitutions, 2 but just compensation
clauses were noticeably absent due to a reliance on the Magna
Carta."3 In 1777, however, the Vermont Constitution provided for
just compensation whenever private property was taken for public
use.
34
As most state constitutions did not include a just compensation
clause, those states were not obligated to compensate owners when
the owner's property was taken for public use. Additionally, the
express just compensation provision of the fifth amendment was
held not to apply to the states.3" Moreover, while the fourteenth
amendment36 provided that no state shall deprive a person of
property without due process, it was first held that due process did
not include just compensation.37 Ultimately, in 1897, the fifth
amendment was held to apply to the states through the fourteenth
amendment.38 Since then, the states have been obligated to com-
pensate an owner of private property when the owner's property
was taken for public use.
29. One such example occurred in 1224 when Henry III, being in financial need,
ignored the rights expressed in the Magna Carta and seized the land for himself. See THE
TAKING ISSUE, supra note 27, at 58.
30. See, e.g., An Act For Clearing A Road From the Warm Springs in Augusta,
and For Other Purposes therein mentioned, Va. Stats. Ch. XXIV (1772).
31. See e.g., M'Clenachan v. Curwin, 3 Yeates 362, 371-73 (Pa. 1802).
32. For the relevant clause see 3 F. THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITU-
TIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES,
AND COLONIES, Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1688
(1909).
33. The colonial taking provisions specifically relied upon Article 29 of the consoli-
date version of the Magna Carta. See supra note 27.
34. The compensation clause provided, in relevant part, "[wjhenever any particular
man's property is taken for the use of the public, the owner ought to receive an equivalent
in money." Vt. Const. of 1977, Ch.1, art. II, reprinted in Introduction to Vermont State
Papers xv, xvii (W. Slade ed. 1823).
35. The Bill of Rights, of which the fifth amendment is a part, was not adopted
within the Constitution at the Federal Constitutional Convention of 1787. Rather, it was
proposed September 25, 1789, and ratified December 15, 1791.
36. The fourteenth amendment was proposed on June 13, 1866, and ratified July
21, 1868.
37. Davidson v. City of New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1877).
38. Chicago B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
1988]
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B. History of Regulatory Takings
The first significant interpretation of the taking clause came
eighty years after the fifth amendment was ratified. 9 In Pumpelly
v. Green Bay Co.,40 a compensable taking was recognized when a
negligently built dam caused water to physically invade private
property.4' The Supreme Court, however, limited a compensable
taking to a physical invasion that destroyed or impaired the use-
fulness of the property. 2
The physical invasion test 3 expressed in Pumpelly was limited
further by the Court in Mugler v. Kansas." Mugler, a brewery
owner, sued the state of Kansas when a statute prohibiting the
manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquor rendered the brewery
worthless. 5 Mugler contended the statute was an unconstitutional
taking of property requiring compensation46  as stated in
Pumpelly.4 Justice Harlan, writing for the majority of the Court,
distinguished Pumpelly as an action for damages under the state's
eminent domain power, while Mugler arose under the state's po-
lice power.4 8 The Court held that a valid exercise of the police
power is not a taking even if economic loss results. 9 Moreover,
regulation may destroy property which is a public nuisance with-
out establishing a compensable taking."
The question of how far the police power may be stretched
before it creates invalid regulation was confronted in Pennsylvania
Coal v. Mahon .5 The question of compensation was not an issue
as the government was not a party to the action. 2 The Mahon's
39. Both the fifth and fourteenth amendments were a part of the Constitution when
Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871) was decided. However, the just
compensation clause of the fifth amendment was held to apply only to the federal govern-
ment and not to the states. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
40. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
41. Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at 81.
42. Id.
43. The Supreme Court to date has developed four tests to determine when govern-
mental action results in a compensable taking. 1) The physical invasion test: Pumpelly v.
Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871); 2) The public nuisance test: Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); 3) The diminution in value test: Pennsylvania Coal v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); and 4) The balancing test: Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104
(1978).
44. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
45. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 657.
46. Id. at 667.
47. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
48. Mugler, 123 U.S at 668.
49. Id. at 669.
50. Id.
51. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See Freilich, Solving the "Taking" Equation" Making the
Whole Equal the Sum of Its Parts, 15 THE URB. LAW. 447, 464 (1983); Williams, The
White River Junction Manifesto, 9 VT. L. REV. 193, 208-09 (1984).
52. Only private litigants were involved as the Mahons sued Pennsylvania Coal, and
[Vol. 24
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predecessor in title purchased only surface rights to property from
the coal company and waived all claims for damages resulting
from subsurface mining. The Mahons sued the coal company for
mining under their house which caused it to subside in violation of
a state statute prohibiting such mining.5 a In an opinion by Justice
Holmes, the Court found the statute to be an invalid exercise of
the police power and labeled it a "taking. '54 Within the context of
Pennsylvania Coal, a taking was only used to describe an invalid
exercise of the police power rather than a compensable event;55
thus, the police power is limited. 56 An exercise of the power of
eminent domain, however, may be used to accomplish the same
objective that may not be achieved through regulation."
The application of the taking clause to municipal zoning strate-
gies came in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co."8 There, the
Court was asked to decide whether a comprehensive zoning plan 9
was an unconstitutional taking of property without due process of
law under the fourteenth amendment. The plan regulated and re-
stricted the location of industries and homes, the lot areas upon
which improvements could be built, and the size and height of the
buildings.60 While upholding the ordinance as a valid exercise of
the police power, the Court said that an ordinance will not be
deemed a taking unless it is "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable,
having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals
or general welfare." 61 The Court also said, however, that an inva-
lid exercise of the police power defies precise definition and there-
fore must be subjectively decided on a case-by-case basis.6 2
The first modern analysis of a taking claim based upon a zoning
not the state of Pennsylvania.
53. Pennsylvania Coal, 206 U.S. at 412.
54. "The general rule, at least, is that while property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Id. at 415.
55. See Freilich, supra note 51, at 464; Williams, supra note 51, at 208.
56. Police power is limited to the extent that it may not go "too far." The invalidity
of a regulation must be decided on a case by case or ad hoc basis. See supra note 54.
57. "[S]ome values are enjoyed under an implied limitation, and must yield to the
police power. But obviously the implied limitation must have its limits or the contract and
due process clauses are gone. One fact for consideration in determining such limits is the
extent of the diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases
there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act." Penn-
sylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413.
58. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
59. A comprehensive zoning plan is the basic instrument for land use planning. 82
AM JUR. 2D Zoning and Planning § 69 (1964).
60. On November 13, 1922, the Euclid village council adopted an ordinance estab-
lishing a comprehensive zoning plan. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 379-80
(1926).
61. Id. at 395.
62. Id. at 387.
19881
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ordinance is found in Penn Central Transportation v. New York.63
The challenged ordinance, the Landmark Preservation Law,64 was
designed to preserve historic landmarks and districts within New
York City. The Grand Central Terminal, owned by Penn Central
Transportation Co., was designated a "landmark." Penn Central
sought approval from the Landmark Preservation Commission 5 to
construct a 550-story office building atop the terminal. 66 The
Commission denied the proposed construction and Penn Central
brought an action claiming its property had been taken. Penn
Central claimed both a fifth and fourteenth amendment violation.
It claimed that just compensation was not paid for the taking of
their property, and that it was deprived of its property without
due process. 8 In an opinion written by Justice Brennan, 9 the
Court admitted that there is no precise test to determine when
regulation ends and a compensable taking begins.7 0 The Court set
forth several significant factors7 1 to aid in the determination of
whether a regulation is invalid or whether a compensable taking
did occur.
First, the regulation's economic impact on the claimant and the
extent to which the regulation has interfered with "distinct invest-
ment-backed expectations" 72 must be considered. The fact that a
regulation has a more severe impact on some landowners does not
63. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
64. Pursuant to a New York State enabling Act the Landmarks Preservation Act
was adopted in 1965. See NYC Admin. Code, ch. 8-A, § 205.1.0 (1976). Penn Central,
438 U.S. at 109.
65. The primary responsibility for administering the law is vested in the Landmark
Preservation Commission. The Commission is an 11-member agency that is required to
include at least three architects, one historian qualified in the field, one city planner or
landscape architect, one realtor, and at least one resident of each of the city's five bor-
oughs. NYC Charter § 534 (1976). Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 110.
66. Penn Central, 438 U.S. 116-17.
67. Id. at 117-19.
68. Id. at 118-19.
69. Justices Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmun and Powell joined Justice Bren-
nan in the majority opinion. Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Stevens joined.
70. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123-24.
71. In his opinion, Justice Brennan suggests that invalidation and not compensation
is the appropriate remedy for an unconstitutional regulation. "[W]hether a particular re-
striction will be rendered invalid by the goverilment's failure to pay for any losses proxi-
mately caused by it depends largely upon the particular circumstances [in that] case'." Id.
at 125. In addition, Justice Brennan uses Holme's analysis in Pennsylvania Coal, 206 U.S.
at 413. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. Brennan considered whether the inter-
ference with appellants' property was of such a "magnitude" that 'there must be an exer-
cise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain [it]'." Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136.
72. Investment-backed expectations are those expectations concerning the present
ability to use property for its intended purpose in a gainful fashion. Penn Central, 438 U.S.
at 138 n.36.
8
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mean that an ordinance effects a taking. 3 In Penn Central, the
Landmark ordinance was upheld because it did not interfere with
the present interest and primary expectations of use of the termi-
nal. 4 More importantly, the Court found that the Landmark ordi-
nance permitted Penn Central to "obtain a reasonable return on
its investment. '7 5 Second, the "character of the governmental ac-
tion"7 6 must be considered. A taking may be more readily found
when there is a physical invasion as opposed to a regulatory
invasion. 77
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Stevens dissented on the ground that a compensable taking within
the meaning of the fifth amendment had occurred. 8 Justice Rehn-
quist defined a compensable taking as an invasion that creates
substantial damage to property regardless of whether the owner
may make some reasonable use of the property. 9
Another taking claim based upon a municipal zoning ordinance
found its way to the Supreme Court in Agins v. City of Tiburon.8"
The Agins case provided the modern view for analyzing available
remedies for objectionable land-use regulation. In Agins, the City
of Tiburon, in which the Agins owned five acres of unimproved
land, passed a zoning ordinance designating the Agins' property as
a residential planned development and open space zone.8 This
designation placed density restrictions on the land which in turn
limited its potential development to five single family homes.8"
The Agins brought suit for inverse condemnation" damages of
two million dollars alleging that the zoning ordinance had taken
their property without just compensation in violation of the fifth
and fourteenth amendments.84
The California Supreme Court struck down the claim saying
"although a landowner so aggrieved may challenge both the con-
73. Id. at 133.
74. Id. at 136.
75. The Court felt that Penn Central "obtained a reasonable return on its invest-
ment" because its designation as a landmark permitted the continued use as a railroad
terminal containing offices and concessions, a use the property had been put to for the past
65 years. Id. at 136.
76. Id. at 124.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 149-50 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 149-50.
80. 447 U.S. 225 (1980).
81. Agins, 447 U.S. at 257.
82. Id. at 257.
83. "Inverse condemnation is a shorthand description of the manner in which a
landowner recovers just compensation for a taking of his property when condemnation pro-
ceeding have not been instituted." Id. at 258 n.2.
84. Id. at 258.
1988]
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stitutionality of the ordinance and the manner in which it is ap-
plied to his property by seeking to establish the invalidity of the
ordinance either through the remedy of declaratory relief or man-
damus, he may not recover damages on the theory of inverse con-
demnation"."8 By foreclosing the damage theory, the California
Supreme Court implied that zoning ordinances are never properly
challenged as being a fifth amendment taking. 6
The Agins appealed to the United States Supreme Court on the
issue of whether the California Supreme Court could properly
limit the remedies for excessive regulations deemed a taking. The
Court, however, did not reach this issue because it affirmed the
decision on the basis that no taking had occurred.87 The Court
recognized that while no precise rule exists to determine when a
taking has occurred, private and public interests must be balanced
to determine whether public regulation has infringed upon private
usage to an extent prohibited by the fifth amendment.8 8 In order
to balance private and public interest, the Court considered
whether the zoning ordinance substantially advanced legitimate
governmental goals, 9 benefited the landowner as well as the pub-
lic90 and permitted the landowner to pursue reasonable investment
expectations."'
The availability of compensation for regulatory takings was
again at issue in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San
Diego92 when a public utility challenged the actions of The City of
San Diego. In 1966, the utility company acquired 412 acres of
land as a potential site for a nuclear power plant.9a At the time of
the acquisition, 116 acres were zoned for industrial use and the
remainder was zoned agricultural. 4 A year later, the city enacted
a master plan designating most of the tract for future industrial
85. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 269-70, 598 P.2d 25, 26, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 372, 373, affld, 447 U.S. 225 (1980).
86. See Note, Taking Law-Is Inverse Condemnation An Appropriate Remedy for
Due Process Violations?-San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S.
621 (1981), 57 WASH. L. REv. 551, 560 (1982).
87. A unanimous Court upheld the validity of the zoning ordinance on its face and
found that it did not amount to compensable taking Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S.
225, 262 (1980).
88. Id. at 260.
89. Id. at 261.
90. Id. at 262.
91. Id. at 262-63.
92. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
93. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 624.
94. The city had classified 116 acres as industrial and 112 acres as agricultural.
The latter classification was reserved for "undeveloped areas not yet ready for urbanization
and awaiting development, those areas where agricultural usage may be reasonably ex-
pected to persist or areas designated as open space in the general plan." San Diego Gas,
450 U.S. at 624 n.4 (citing San Diego Ordinance No. 8706 (New Series)).
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use.95 In 1973, however, the city "down-zoned" 96 thirty-nine acres
from industrial to agriculture and changed the designation of 214
acres from "future industrial to open space."'97 When a seismic
offshore fault was discovered, the utility company abandoned its
plans for a nuclear power plant and was thus confronted with the
prospect of having to sell the property subject to its open space
designation, which reduced the value of the land.98
The utility company instituted an action for inverse condemna-
tion alleging that the city's "down-zoning" action in 1973 was a
taking of property without just compensation.99 The San Diego
County Superior Court ruled that the findings established that the
city had taken the property and just compensation was re-
quired.100 A subsequent jury trial on the question of damages re-
sulted in an award for over three million dollars for the utility
company.10'
The California Court of Appeal ultimately reversed the judg-
ment of the superior court.'02 In an unpublished decision, the ap-
pellate court held that the utility company could not recover mon-
etary damages through inverse condemnation, but rather
invalidation of the ordinance was the sole remedy. 0 3 Moreover,
the Court of Appeal held that on the state of the record, insuffi-
cient evidence precluded a finding that a taking had occurred.
Specifically, the plaintiff had not proved that the city's zoning ac-
tion effected a taking. The California Supreme Court denied fur-
ther review, and the company appealed to the United States Su-
preme Court. 04 After hearing arguments on the merits, the Court
dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds stating that the Cali-
95. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 624.
96. Downzoning and upzoning are words of art that provide a descriptive and uni-
versal shorthand. Upzoning refers to a rezoning or reclassification to a more intensive use
category which is usually more profitable to the landowner. Downzoning is a rezoning or
reclassification to a less intensive use which general decreases the land value. 6A A.
RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 27.02 [3] (1987).
97. Open space is "any urban land or water surface that is essentially open or natu-
ral in character, and which has appreciable utility for park and recreation or other natural
resources or historic or scenic purposes." San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 625.
98. Id. at 627.
99. Id. at 625-26.
100. Id. at 627.
101. The California Court of Appeal originally affirmed the Superior Court's deci-
sion. San Diego Gas, 146 Cal. Rptr. 103 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (opinion vacated by the
California Supreme Court's grant of the city's petition for a hearing). Before the hearing,
the California Supreme Court transferred the case back to the court of appeal for reconsid-
eration in light of the intervening decision of Agins, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 372 (1979), affd, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). See supra notes 80-91 and accompanying
text.
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fornia Court of Appeal had not rendered a final judgment or de-
cree upon which an appeal could be heard.1"5
Dissenting, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart, Mar-
shall and Powell, interpreted the California Court of Appeal's rul-
ing that no taking had occurred as a final judgment. 00 The dis-
sent concluded that the fifth amendment demands that just
compensation be provided when property is taken by excessive
land use regulation.0 The dissent argued that once a court estab-
lishes that there has been a regulatory taking, the governmental
entity must pay just compensation for the period commencing on
the date the regulation first effected the taking and ending on the
date the governmental entity chooses to rescind or otherwise
amend the regulation. 08
Justice Rehnquist, in a concurring opinion stated that if juris-
diction had been found, he would "have little difficulty in agreeing
with much of what is said in the dissenting opinion."' 0 9 Thus, five
justices" laid the foundation for what was to become the law of
the land:"' Namely, that the fifth amendment requires that dam-
ages be available as a remedy in a regulatory taking case." 2
The United States Supreme Court confronted the issue of dam-
ages for a regulatory taking claim a third time in Williamson
County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank."3
Hamilton Bank, owners of a tract of land being developed as a
residential subdivision, filed suit in district court pursuant to 42
U.S.C. section 1983,1"4 after a zoning ordinance reduced the al-
lowable density of the land." 5 The suit alleged that the applica-
tion of various zoning laws and regulations amounted to a taking
105. Id. at 630 n.10.
106. The Court of Appeal's "no taking" rule was a "classic final judgment" and
therefore the dissent considered the merits of the case. Id. at 646 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 658.
108. The rule that Justice Brennan proposed would establish compensation for tem-
porary takings. Id. at 658.
109. Id. at 633-34 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
110. The justices include Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Powell and Rehnquist. See
supra notes 107 and 108 and accompanying text.
111. Justice Brennan's dissent in San Diego Gas was repeatedly cited and quoted
within the decision of First English, 107 S. Ct. 2378.
112. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
113. 474 U.S. 172 (1985).
114. Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or territory of the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable
exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981).
115. Williamson, 474 U.S at 178-79.
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of the property without just compensation."'
After a three week trial, the jury found that Hamilton Bank
had been denied "economically viable" use of its property in viola-
tion of the just compensation clause of the fifth amendment and
damages were awarded. 117 The trial court, however, granted a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the commission
and refused to award damages for what it found to be a tempo-
rary taking.1 8 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, hold-
ing that application of government regulations affecting an
owner's use of property may constitute a taking if the regulation
denies the owner all "economically viable" uses of the land." 9 The
Court of Appeal, relying upon Justice Brennan's dissent in San
Diego Gas, determined that damages were required for a tempo-
rary taking.120
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address
the question of whether federal, state and local governments must
pay monetary damages to a landowner whose property is tempora-
rily taken by government regulations.12' In an opinion by Justice
Blackmun, joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice O'Connor, and
Justice Rehnquist, the court passed on the merits of the case hold-
ing that the claim was "not ripe.' 22
In a separate opinion, Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred
that the taking claim was premature, without departing from the
view set forth in Justice Brennan's San Diego Gas dissent. 2 1
Their concurring opinion restated the view that invalidation of an
ordinance without just compensation is insufficient to compensate
a landowner for economic loss suffered during the taking.'
24
Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion, wrote that a regulation
that "goes too far" may be repealed without giving rise to com-
pensation. If property is harmed without due process of law, how-
ever, damages may be based upon a denial of procedural rights. 2 ,
Anxious to resolve the remedy issue for regulatory takings, the
Supreme Court granted review to MacDonald, Sommer & Frates
116. Id. at 182.
117. Id. at 182-83.
118. Id. at 183.
119. Id. at 183-84.
120. Id. at 184.
121. Id. at 184.
122. The Court felt that the taking issue was premature for two reasons. First, a
final decision regarding that application of the zoning ordinance as applied to the property
in question had not been obtained. Second, a property owner must seek compensation
through the procedures provided by the state before bringing an action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1981) in federal district court. Id. at 186.
123. See supra notes 107 and 108 and accompanying text.
124. Williamson, 474 U.S. at 201 (Brennan, J., concurring).
125. Id. at 203-05 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
1988]
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v. Yolo County in 1985.126 In MacDonald, a California property
owner submitted a proposal to the Yolo County Planning Com-
mission to subdivide certain property into 159 single-family and
multi-family lots. 127 The Commission rejected the proposal, and
the Yolo County Board of Supervisors affirmed on the ground that
the proposal failed to provide public access, sewer service, water
supply and police protection.1 28 An action was filed in superior
court alleging a taking had occurred without just compensation.129
The court sustained a demurrer, holding that monetary damages
for inverse condemnation were foreclosed by Agins. 3 ° The Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals affirmed and the California Supreme
Court denied further review. The United States Supreme Court
noted probable jurisdiction because "of the importance of the
question whether a monetary remedy in inverse condemnation is
constitutionally required in appropriate cases involving regulatory
'takings.11131
In an opinion by Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun, and O'Connor, it was held that an essential
prerequisite to a claim of regulatory taking is a "final and authori-
tative determination of the type and intensity of development le-
gally permitted on the subject property.' 1 32 The Court refused to
decide the case on the merits as the antecedent issue of whether
the property in question had been taken was not yet final.' 33 A
dissenting opinion written by Justice White, joined by Chief Jus-
tice Burger and partly joined by Justices Powell and Rehnquist,
however, expressed the view that the allegations were sufficient to
state a regulatory taking claim." 4
During the 1986 term, there were three cases before the United
States Supreme Court dealing with regulatory takings. 35 The first
case, Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, re-
affirmed the ability of governmental agencies to regulate private
property to protect public health, safety and welfare. 3 6 The sec-
ond case, First English, held that compensation is available when
land use regulation deprives an owner of all use of his property,
126. 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986).
127. MacDonald, 106 S. Ct. at 2563.
128. Id. at n.2.
129. Id. at 2563-64.
130. See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
131. MacDonald, 106 S. Ct. at 2565-66.
132. Id. at 2566.
133. Id. at 2568-69.
134. Id. at 2569.
135. See infra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
136. 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987). Keystone was decided on March 9, 1987, and reaf-
firmed Pennsylvania Coal. See also supra notes 51-57.
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and is the focus of this article.'37 The third case, Nollan v. Cali-
fornia Costal Commission, held that an unconstitutional regula-
tion is one that bears no reasonable connection to the public inter-
est it seeks to protect.138
II. FIRST ENGLISH EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH OF
GLENDALE V. COUNTY OF Los ANGELES
The Supreme Court in First English held that when property
owners are denied even temporary use of the their property as the
result of an unconstitutional regulation, they are entitled to dam-
ages. 139 The facts of First English are simple.' 40
The First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale
owns twenty-one acres of land in a canyon along the banks of the
Middle Fork of Mill Creek in the Angeles National Forest.' 4' The
church operated a camp known as "Lutherglen" on twelve of the
twenty-one acres. 142
In 1977, a forest fire destroyed approximately 3,860 acres of the
watershed area upstream from Lutherglen. This created a poten-
tial flood hazard. 43 In 1978, a storm dropped eleven inches of rain
in the burned out watershed area causing the banks of the Middle
Fork and Mill Creek to overflow. Lutherglen was flooded, and its
buildings were destroyed.
In the aftermath of the flood, Los Angeles County adopted an
interim ordinance' 44 prohibiting construction in the area that in-
137. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987). First English was decided on June 7, 1987.
138. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987). Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n was decided on
June 26, 1987.
139. The Court found the constitutional question of just compensation "squarely
presented" in First English due to the California Supreme Court's decision in Agins that
foreclosed the availability of damages to redress a "temporary regulatory taking". First
English 107 S. Ct. at 2384.
140. As the result of the United States Supreme Court decision discussed infra. First
English was remanded back to the trial court for both the determination that a "taking"
had occurred and the damages resulting therefrom.
141. The church purchased this land, located just north of the City of Los Angeles,
California in 1957. The Middle Fork of Mill Creek is the natural drainage channel for a
watershed owned by the National Forest Service. Id. at 2381.
142. Lutherglen served as a retreat and a recreational area for handicapped children.
The camp consisted of a dining hall, two bunkhouses, a caretaker's lodge, an outdoor
chapel and a footbridge accross Mill Creek. Id. at 2381.
143. "The vegetation of a watershed area normally protects against flooding because
the vegetation slows the flow of water, which can then percolate into the soil or be carried
away by steams. When the vegetation is burned, however, there is no slowing of the flow,
and the crust on the ground formed by the fire's intense heat prevents percolation of water
into the soil." First English, Supreme Court Brief for Appellant, Jurisdictional Statement,
App. A, pp. A2-2, n. I.
144. On January 11, 1979, interim ordinance No. 11, 855 which provided in relevant
part, "[a] person shall not construct, reconstruct, place, enlarge any building or structure,
any portion of which is, or will be, located within the outer boundary lines of the interim
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cluded the land on which Lutherglen had stood. A little more than
a month after the ordinance was adopted, the Church filed suit in
the Los Angeles County Superior Court.1 45 The complaint alleged
that the ordinance denied the church all use of Lutherglen and
sought to recover damages in inverse condemnation of the loss of
use.
1 46
The Los Angeles County Superior Court, relying on Agins,4 7
dismissed the suit. The trial court explained that "when an ordi-
nance, even a nonzoning ordinance, deprives a person of the total
use of his lands, his challenge to the ordinance is by way of de-
claratory relief or possibly mandamus."' 48
On appeal, the California Court of Appeal followed Agins and
affirmed the trial court decision . 49 The Court of Appeal read the
complaint as one seeking "damages for the uncompensated taking
of all use of Lutherglen." °50 Further review was denied by the
California Supreme Court. The United States Supreme Court
noted probable jurisdiction and granted review.' 5
A. The Court's Reasoning: The Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority and joined by
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Powell and Scalia decided
whether the just compensation clause of the fifth amendment re-
quires compensation as a remedy for temporary regulatory tak-
ings. 152 Without deciding whether the particular ordinance denied
the Church all use of its property,' Chief Justice Rehnquist de-
flood protection area located in Mill Creek Canyon . . ." On August I1, 1981, the tempo-
rary ordinance was superseded when the county added Mill Creek to the list of areas that
are subject to the county Code restrictions applicable to flood protection districts. First
English, Supreme Court Brief for Appellant, Jurisdictional Statement, App. F pp. A31-32.
145. On February 21, 1979, this action was filed in Los Angeles County Superior
Court against the County of Los Angeles and the County Flood Control District. First
English, 107 S. Ct. at 2382.
146. The complaint alleges two claims against the County and the Flood Control
District. The first claim alleged that the defendants were liable under California Govern-
ment code Section 835 for a dangerous condition on their upstream properties that contrib-
uted to the flooding of Lutherglen. The second claim alleged the Flood District engaged in
cloud seeding during the storm, for which it is liable in tort and inverse condemnation.
147. See supra notes 80-91 and accompanying text.
148. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2382 (quoting the trial court).
149. The California Court of Appeal in an unpublished opinion concluded "that be-
cause the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the question of whether a state may
constitutionally limit the remedy for a taking to nonmonetary relief, this court is obligated
to follow Agins." First English Supreme Court Brief for Appellant, jurisdictional State-
ment, App. A. p. A16.
150. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2838.
151. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in April 1986.
152. See supra note 139.
153. The Court rejected the suggestion that they must resolve the "taking" claim on
the merits and remanded the case for further proceedings.
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clared that temporary takings that deny "all use" of property "are
not different in kind from permanent takings."' 154 The Court
added that while invalidating the ordinance converts the taking
into a temporary one, invalidation alone "is not a sufficient rem-
edy to meet the demands of the just compensation clause."'5 5 The
Court concluded that the just compensation clause of the fifth
amendment, therefore, requires the payment of compensation
whenever a taking occurs, even when the taking is only temporary.
The majority opinion in First English can be broken down into
three foundational elements. First, land-use restrictions can effect
a taking. Second, temporary land-use restrictions can effect a tak-
ing. Third, just compensation is available as a remedy whenever
land-use restrictions effect a taking.
1. Land-use Restrictions Can Effect A Taking-The theory
that land-use restrictions can effect a taking is not new. The regu-
latory taking doctrine is said to have originated with Penn Coal,
in which Justice Holmes wrote that a taking will be recognized if
regulations go "too far".'56 The First English Court noted that
takings typically occur when the government condemns property
in the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Takings however,
may occur without formal eminent domain proceedings when
landowners institute inverse condemnation actions against a
government. 15 7
2. Temporary Land-use Restrictions Can Effect A Tak-
ing-The majority in First English conceeded that the availability
of damages for temporary regulatory takings required an interpre-
tation of the just compensation clause of the fifth amendment. 58
In this light, the Court drew upon a comparison between interim
regulations and abandonment of condemnation proceedings. 59 In
cases where condemnation proceedings were abandoned and the
government only temporarily exercised its right to use private
property, there is no question that compensation is required. 60 It
follows, therefore, that temporary regulatory takings that deny
154. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2384.
155. Id. at 2388.
156. See supra note 54. The First English Court asserted this premise even though
Pennsylvania Coal was an injunctive relief action between private parties where from Jus-
tice Holmes was presenting the "too far" concept in the due process context.
157. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2386; see supra notes 17 and 83.
158. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2387.
159. The Court looked to cases in which government temporarily exercised its right
to use private property under its power of eminent domain as substantial guidance for the
imposition of damages for interim regulations. Id. at 2387.
160. Id. at 2378.
1988]
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landowners all use of their property "are not different in kind
from permanent takings." 16'
Further, Chief Justice Rehnquist, borrowing from Justice Bren-
nan, restated that "[n]othing in the just compensation clause sug-
gests that 'takings' must be permanent and irrevocable." " 2 The
Court opined that since the United States has been required to
pay compensation for leasehold interests of shorter duration than
the interim ordinance at issue in First English, the just compensa-
tion clause requires that the government pay the landowner for
the value of the use of the land during the interim period. 63 The
Court, therefore, directly linked regulatory taking cases, even for
temporary regulations, to the just compensation clause of the fifth
amendment.
3. Remedy For Property Owner Is Just Compensation-After
linking excessive regulatory cases to the just compensation clause,
even for temporary regulations, the Court quickly disposed of the
sufficiency of Agins' "no compensation rule. 1 64 The Court stated
that "invalidation of the ordinance is not a sufficient remedy to
meet the demands of the just compensation clause."'6
The Court emphasized that its holding is limited to the facts
presented in First English and did not deal with the "quite differ-
ent questions that would arise in the case of normal delays in ob-
taining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances and the
like. ' 166 The Court admitted that the holding in First English
"[would] undoubtedly lessen to some extent the freedom and flexi-
bility of land use planners and government bodies of municipal
corporations when enacting land-use regulations.' 67 The Court
reasoned, however, that many constitutional provisions, including
the just compensation clause of the fifth amendment, are designed
to limit the power of governmental authorities. 6 '
161. Id. at 2388.
162. Id. at 2389 (quoting San Diego Gas, 101 S. Ct. at 1307 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)).
163. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2388.
164. Id. at 2389.
165. Id. at 2389.
166. The Court went on to hold that "where the government's activities have already
worked a taking of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve
it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during which the taking was effec-
tive." Id. at 1289.
167. Id. at 2388.
168. Id. at 2389.
[Vol. 24.
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B. The Court's Reasoning: The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens, joined in part by Justice Blackmun and Justice
O'Connor lashed out at the majority acrimoniously. 6 9 The dissent
challenged the majority opinion as "superficial", "imprudent" and
"dangerous". 17 0 Justice Stevens stressed that "in order to protect
the health and safety of the community,"''M the government may
impose regulations without the burden of compensating property
owners for individual pecuniary losses sustained as a result of the
regulation.12
Justice Stevens highlighted "four flaws" of the majority opin-
ion: (1) the majority's presumption of unconstitutionality; 73 (2)
the majority's interpretation of what facts constitute a temporary
regulatory taking;174 (3) the majority's understanding of the
Agins' "no compensation rule"; 175 and (4) the majority's use of
the just compensation clause as a vehicle for dilatory procedures
in the land-use area. 76
1. The Majority's Presumption Of Unconstitutional Taking
Is Improper-Justice Stevens noted that the Court should have
ruled that the property owner's complaint did not allege a taking
under the Constitution.7 He asserted that regardless of the prop-
erty owner's bold allegations that the ordinance denied it "all use"
of its property, the Court's precedents clearly demonstrate that
the ordinance, as a valid exercise of the state's police power, can-
not constitute a taking.78
Further, Justice Stevens argued that the long-standing rule of
presumption of constitutionality that applies to legislative enact-
ment applies in this case. 7 9 The property owner did not allege
that the ordinance is invalid, pray for a declaration of invalidity or
seek an injunction against its enforcement, nor are there any facts
regarding the interference with future use of the property. 80
Therefore, Justice Stevens argued that the Court should have re-
jected First English on its merits. 81
169. Id. at 2389-2400 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 2393.
171. Id. at 2391.
172. Id. at 2391-92.




177. Id. at 2391.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 2392.
180. Id.
181. Id at 2393.
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2. The Majority Misconstrues What Facts Constitute A Tem-
porary Regulatory Taking-Justice Stevens did not dispute the
proposition that a regulation which goes "too far"'"2 is a taking. 8 3
He asserted, however, that in most cases, invalidation of a regula-
tion will mitigate any diminution in property value. As such, the
regulation cannot be classified a taking.'8 4
Temporary interference with an owner's use of his property
may constitute a taking for which just compensation is required if
the interference is physical. 85 Justice Stevens insisted, however,
that only when a regulation destroys a major portion of a prop-
erty's value will the temporary existence of a regulation be so ex-
treme that invalidation alone will not mitigate damages.' Ac-
cording to Justice Stevens, the issue was not whether the
"regulation would constitute a 'taking' if allowed to remain in ef-
fect" but whether the regulation was so severe as to constitute a
taking during the period the regulation was in effect.'8 7
Justice Stevens, writing alone in this section, 88 illuminated the
"diminution in value" inquiry that is unique to regulatory taking
analysis.' 89 He argued that the "diminution in value" of the prop-
erty in question must be evaluated along with the extent to which
the owner may not use the property, the amount of property en-
compassed by the restriction and the duration of the restriction. 90
Justice Stevens concluded that only careful balancing can deter-
mine the "dividing line" between everyday regulatory inconve-
niences and those so severe that they constitute takings.' 9'
3. The Majority Misinterprets The Agins Rule-The dissent-
ing opinion expressed concern regarding the majority's apparent
misunderstanding of the rule pronounced by the California Su-
preme Court' in Agins. 92 In Agins, the California Supreme Court
182. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
183. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2393.
184. Id. at 2393.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. To determine if a regulatory taking has occurred you must examine depth,
width and length of the regulation. "As for the depth, regulations define the extent to
which the owner may not use the property in question. With respect to width, regulations
define the amount of property encompassed by the restrictions. Finally, for purposes of this
case, essentially, regulations set forth due duration of the restriction. It is obvious that no
one of these elements can be analyzed alone to evaluate the impact of a regulation, and
hence to determine whether a taking had occurred." Id. at 2394.
188. Id. at 2393-96.
189. Id. See also supra note 56 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 186.
191. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2394.
192. Id. at 2396-97.
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decided that mandamus or declaratory relief rather than inverse
condemnation provided "the appropriate relief" for one who chal-
lenges a regulation as a taking.1"3 Justice Stevens stated that the
majority in First English erred when it claimed that the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that landowners may not recover dam-
ages for the time before a regulation is deemed a taking.9
First, Justice Stevens, referring to previous dissenting opin-
ions, 195 stated that "the court recognizes" that California courts
have the right to choose what remedies are available to an ag-
grieved landowner. 96 Second, Justice Stevens believed the major-
ity had unjustifiably speculated on how the California courts
would deal with the "temporary regulatory" issue. 97 Justice Ste-
vens argued that the Agins rule may be interpreted by California
courts to mean that a property owner must exhaust equitable rem-
edies before asserting a claim for damages.' 98 Further, even if the
Agins rule precludes damages for a temporary regulatory taking,
the property owner must allege why declaratory relief would not
provide an adequate remedy.' 99
4. The Due Process Clause, Not The Taking Clause, Protects
Property Owners From Improper Governmental Decisionmak-
ing-Justice Stevens renewed his argument"' that the due process
clause, not the just compensation clause, should be used to protect
landowners from regulation that goes "too far." '' In fact, under
this view, excessive regulation is not a taking at all, but a depriva-
tion of due process under the fourteenth amendment. 0 2 However,
because the Court held that excessive regulation is a taking re-
quiring just compensation, Justice Stevens warned that the major-
ity's decision will open a floodgate of litigation and have a chilling
193. Id. at 2397 (citing Agins, 24 Cal. 3d at 277).
194. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2397 (citing to the majority opinion, 107 S. Ct. at
2381).
195. MacDonald, 106 S. Ct. at 2569 (White, J., dissenting); San Diego Gas, 101 S.
Ct. at 1306 (Brennan J., dissenting); First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2396.
196. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2396.
197. Id. at 2397.
198. Id. at 2397.
199. Id. at 2397-98.
200. See Justices Stevens' concurrence in Williamson County Planning Commission
v. Hamilton Bank, 474 U.S. 172 (1985); see supra note 125 and accompanying text. See
also Justices Steven's dissent in First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2398-2400.
201. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2399.
202. Since the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires a state to
employ fair procedures in the administration and enforcement of regulations, property own-
ers are protected from improperly motivated, unfairly conducted or unnecessarily pro-
tracted governmental decisionmaking. As such, violation of these procedural safeguards are
a due process violation.
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effect on the regulatory land use process:203 "Cautious local offi-
cials and land-use planners may avoid needed legislative action
that might later be challenged and thus give rise to a damage ac-
tion. Much important regulation will never be enacted, even per-
haps in the health and safety area. 204
III. ANALYSIS: LAND-USE REGULATION FROM LEGISLATIVE
AND LITIGATION PERSPECTIVES
The United States Supreme Court's decision in First English
bridges the compensation remedy to circumstances where exces-
sive government regulation denies a landowner all use of his prop-
erty, even for a temporary period.205 While the ruling seems
straightforward, the Court expressly limited the holding of First
English to the facts of the case.208
Before the decision in First English, invalidation of an ordi-
nance without compensation was viewed as adequate remedy for
an unconstitutional regulation.207 Damages could be obtained for
violations of due process during the legislative process, if a prop-
erty owner was damaged thereby. Under Agins, damages under
an inverse condemnation theory were actionable once a court de-
termined that the challenged regulation was unconstitutional on
its face or as applied. If the ordinance was deemed unconstitu-
tional on its face, then that was the end of the query. If the ordi-
nance was deemed unconstitutional as applied and the government
chose to continue the effect of the ordinance, then the government
would be responsible for compensating the property owner for the
loss. Now, First English states that the government is going to be
responsible for compensating the property owner retroactively af-
ter the ordinance is ruled unconstitutional on its face or as ap-
203. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2389-90.
204. Id. at 2399-2400.
205. See supra note 9.
206. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
207. But see San Diego Gas, 450 U.S at 655 n.22 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Invali-
dation hardly prevents enactment of subsequent unconstitutional regulations by the govern-
ment entity. At the 1974 annual conference of the National Institute of Municipal Law
Officers in California, a California City Attorney gave fellow city attorneys the following
advice: "If all else fails, merely amend the regulation and start over again." If legal pre-
ventive maintenance does not work, and you still receive a claim attacking the land use
regulation or if you try the case and lose, don't worry about it. All is not lost. One of the
extra "goodies" contained in the recent [California] Supreme Court case of Selby v. City
of San Buenaventura, 10 C.3d 101, appears to allow the City to change the regulation,
even after trial and judgment, make it more reasonable, more restrictive, or whatever, and
everybody starts over again. . . . See how easy it is to be a city attorney. Sometimes you
can lose the battle and still win the war. Good luck. Longtin, Avoiding and Defending
Constitutional Attacks on Land Use Regulations (including Inverse Condemnation), 38B
NIMLO MIN. L. REV. 192-93 (1975).
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plied. Further, compensation for damages will be required if an
emergency ordinance or temporary regulation is found to be un-
constitutional as applied or if an ordinance or regulation is found
to effect a taking.208
A. The Future of Land-Use Regulations
1. Other Recent Supreme Court Decisions-An analysis of
First English could not be complete without looking at two other
cases decided by the Supreme Court in the same term: Keystone
Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedicts,0 9 and Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission.21 °
Keystone revisited Penn Coal21 in that several coal companies
claimed that a Pennsylvania act violated, inter alia, the taking
clause because it required that approximately fifty percent of the
coal under structures remain in the ground to prevent building
subsidence. 2  Since Pennsylvania law recognizes three estates in
land, "the mineral estate, the surface estate and the support es-
tate, '213 the coal companies asserted a taking of their "support
estate" in the untouchable coal.2 4
The Supreme Court, stating that portions of its Penn Coal deci-
sion were "advisory, '215 held that no taking had occurred for two
reasons. First, the character of the governmental action was to
abate a public nuisance.216 Second, the act allowed the coal com-
panies to engage profitably in their business.217
Nollan, involved a small house on a beach front lot, between
two public beaches. 218 Between the house and the beach stands an
208. An alternative remedy has always been, and remains, for a plaintiff faced with
injuries attributable to an unreasonable regulation to petition for writ of mandate pursuant
to CCP § 1095 and "recover the damages which he has sustained," and that such damages
"shall be recovered (from) the public entity represented by such officer ... " This remedy,
though, is limited for failure of a public officer to discharge mandatory duty where the
plaintiff seeks ancillary writ in addition to damages authorized by Gov't Code § 15.6. See
also, Van Alstyne, California Government Tort Liability Practice (CEB) (1987) §§ 2.13,
2.47.
209. 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
210. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
211. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
212. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1238-39. See the Bituminous Mine Subsidence and
Land Conservation Act. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 52 § 1406.1 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
213. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1238.
214. Id. at 1239.
215. Pennsylvania Coal does not control this case because the Court felt that the
similarities between Keystone and Pennsylvania Coal were far less significant than the
differences. Id. at 1240.
216. Id. at 1240-41.
217. Id. at 1248.
218. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3143.
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eight-foot high seawall.2 19 The Nollans wanted to replace the
house with a new home and accordingly applied to the California
Coastal Commission for a permit to demolish the old house and
construct the new one.220 After an extended administrative pro-
cess, the permit was granted with the condition that the Nollans
grant a public easement between the seawall and the mean high
tide line. 2 '
The Supreme Court found that the condition was an unconstitu-
tional taking for which damages must be paid.22 In an opinion
written by Justice Scalia, the Court held that the permit condition
did not serve the interest it claimed to serve. Justice Scalia stated
that there must be a "nexus" or reasonable relation between a
land-use regulation and the "legitimate state interest" it is sup-
posed to protect.223 Justice Scalia concluded that the governmen-
tal interest in protecting a continuous strip of publicly accessible
beach is "a good idea" and can be advanced by using the power of
eminent domain.224
In Keystone, Justice Stevens wrote the opinion of the Court
while Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the lead dissent, the flip-side
of the writing assignment in First English.225 The key observation
to note about Keystone is the narrowness of the state's victory,
even though, as Justice Stevens highlights, a property owner
"face[s] an uphill battle" when attacking legislation under the
taking clause.226
In Nollan, Justice Stevens noted that Justice Brennan's position
in San Diego Gas and Nollan, vis-a-vis his position with the ma-
jority in First English, are subjectively inconsistent at best.227 In
San Diego Gas, Justice Brennan stated: "The constitutional rule I
propose requires that, once a court finds a police power regulation
has effected a 'taking', the government entity must pay just com-
pensation for the period commencing on the date the regulation
first effected the 'taking' and ending on the date the government
entity chooses to rescind or otherwise amend the regulation. 228 In
First English, Justice Brennan joined the majority in accord with




222. Id. at 3147.
223. Id. at 3148.
224. Id. at 3150.
225. See supra notes 152 and 169 and accompanying text.
226. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1247.
227. Nollan, 107 S.Ct. at 3163 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
228. Id.
229. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 24
24
California Western Law Review, Vol. 24 [2015], No. 1, Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol24/iss1/4
REGULATORY TAKING
porting the state's police power in imposing a condition on private
development. 30
Justice Brennan defended his position by stating that he sees his
dissent in Nollan as completely consistent with his position in
First English."' He suggested that governments should be given
great latitude in regulating private development; but if regulation
denies the property owner the use of his land and is found to effect
a taking, compensation is the appropriate remedy for the constitu-
tional violation.232 These concepts seem consistent, but they are
dangerously obtuse in light of the fact that the Court has again
failed to enunciate a clear taking test.233
The implication of damage awards against governments ex-
plains the possibility of a "chilling effect" on their regulatory ef-
forts. Justice Stevens argued in his First English dissent that local
governments which would have taken the broad public interest
into account when enacting new regulations might now back off
for fear of being sued by landowners.234
2. Perspective of the Government and Land-Use Plan-
ners-Regardless of how many times the Court implies that gov-
ernment must pay when regulation goes "too far," land use regu-
lation, in its many forms, 35 will be evaluated by the sturdiness of
the foundation upon which it exists, namely, the police power. A
court's vantage of government regulation will continue to be based
upon the "reasonableness" of the regulation.2 36 Despite the inevi-
table and expectable increase in litigation as a result of First
English as is discussed below, the continual lack of a specific and
usable test for determining when a regulation or ordinance
founded upon the police power imposes constitutionally compensa-
ble damages is what is most disappointing about the First English
230. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3160 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
231. Id. at 3162 n.14.
232. See Williams, The White River Junction Manifesto, supra note 51, at 240.
233. There is no precise test to determine when regulation ends and taking begins,
however, the Court has established several factors to aid in the determination. See supra
notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
234. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2399-2400 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
235. E.g., Subdivision controls, dedication on development, building moratoriums,
environmental controls, and zoning.
236. There are four aspects of the term "reasonable" which courts consider. (1) The
regulation must promote an objective which is a proper topic of governmental concern and
there must be a demonstrable relationship between the regulation and the objective. (2)
The objective, though a proper subject of government concern, must not be one ordinarily
attained through eminent domain. (3) Land owners who are similarly situated must receive
equal treatment. (4) The extent to which the regulation reduces the economic value of the
land must no be "too severe," but the extent of permitted devaluation may be . . . related
to the objective of the regulation. See Broadhead & Rosenfield, Open Space Zoning Hand-
book 15 (California Assembly Select Committee on Open Space Lands 1973).
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decision.237 What good is it for a local official to know that a tem-
porary or interim ordinance might result in a compensable taking
when the official knows as little about the temporary taking stan-
dard as he or she did about the permanent taking standard.
Many planners in California are devising strategies to control
growth so that government can provide expected services to the
public. Some municipalities, for example, are adopting interim or-
dinances controlling or limiting development.238 While certainly
meeting constitutional demands of due process, it will be difficult
to forecast how these ordinances will hold up against the "great
latitude" but "just compensation" scale that the First English
Court has conjured.239
If the test for temporary takings is the government's denial of
"all use" of property, then planners have a bright-line taking test,
at least for a temporary taking.24 ° But the Court did not establish
an "all use" test. Instead, the Court "assumed" that all use of the
property was denied by the interim ordinance in order to reach the
remedy issue.241 Planners are thus forced to deal with emergency
legislation in the same unpredictable light as permanent legisla-
tion and should not be tempted to believe that the Court is head-
ing toward an "all use" test for interim legislation.242
The more likely future is that the Court will unmask the case-
by-case approach that has been the Court's solution in past
cases. 243 Hopefully, the Court will establish guidelines for plan-
ners to fathom as they prepare and recommend interim
legislation.
For example, reasonableness can be measured by a well-docu-
237. See Van Alsytne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for In-
verse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1970); Sax, Takings, Private Property
and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); EPSTEIN. TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
238. San Diego, Cal., Interim Development Ordinance 0-16908 (New Series) (July
21, 1987), as amended by 0-1940 (New Series) (Sept. 14, 1987).
239. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3163 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("state agencies therefore
require considerable flexibility in responding to private desires for development. . . . They
should be encouraged to regulate development in the context of the overall balance of com-
peting uses."). See supra note 232 and acompanying text. See also G. Bauman, The Su-
preme Court Becomes Serious About Takings Law: The First Church, Keystone and Ir-
ving Cases, 10 ZONING AND PLANNING LAW REPORT 8, at 151 (Sept. 1987).
240. The majority in First English noted that it had "no occasion to decide whether
the county might avoid the conclusion that a compensable taking had occurred by estab-
lishing that the denial of all use was insulated as a part of the states authority to enact
safety regulations" First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2384.
241. Id. at 2389.
242. Accord Merritt & Dillon, Damages as a Remedy for Temporary "Regulatory
Takings" of Property: The Impact of First Lutheran, Real Property Law Reporter Vol. X,
No. 6, p. 125 (Aug. 1987) at 131.
243. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
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mented legislative record which includes all hearings in which af-
fected property owners had the opportunity to participate. The
legislative mind processes must be articulated and alternative
methods considered and logically eliminated. The benefits which
are created as a result of the legislation should be articulated pro-
spectively rather than retrospectively when and if the legislation is
challenged in court. Benefits include those which are unique to the
landowner as well as to the public at large.
Much can also be done at the grass roots level, especially since
many land-use decisions are scrutinized by special interest
groups.2 44 For example, effective liaison and communication with
community leaders usually renders an effective consensus which
results in legislation supported by homeowners associations and
adversely affected property owners.
Of course, these examples of documentation are sometimes im-
practicable in light of the fact that planners are already over-
worked in meeting their responsive duties let alone being proactive
in advancing interim legislation. The correct response by planners
as a result of First English, is to maintain a responsible and
steadfast posture-unaffected by the noise First English is bound
to make. 45
B. The Litigation Explosion and Beyond
In the words of Justice Stevens, "[o]ne thing is certain. The
Court's decision [in First English] will generate a great deal of
litigation. '246
First, land-use litigation may be more attractive to property
owners when compensation is available in addition to invalidation
of the involved ordinance. However, the loss of rather than in lieu
of use of the property during a temporary taking may be so mini-
mal that litigation may be deemed "unproductive. '247
Second, since the key issue of when regulation ends and a com-
pensable taking begins has been left unresolved,248 further litiga-
244. E.g., environmentalists, no-growth proponents, and neighborhood preservation-
ists are among the common groups affecting land-use decisions.
245. Such overreaction as that which occurred in San Francisco is unwarranted. Just
a few days after First English was decided, Mayor Dianne Feinstein of San Francisco, on
the advice of City Attorney, Louise Renne, vetoed a building moratorium in a five-block
area of a congested neighborhood, saying she couldn't approve it because of the First
English ruling. Fulton, A New Era for Private Property Rights, CALIF. LAWYER, Nov.
1987, p. 27, 28.
246. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2389-90.
247. Justice Stevens believes that most of the litigation generated by the First En-
glish decision will be "unproductive." Id.
248. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
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tion will be necessary to establish what is a taking. 49
1. Federal Court Remedie.-Another area of concern relates
to municipal liability for "policy or custom" established through
the acts of its public officials charged with the responsibility of
drafting regulations for the public welfare. 5 Such civil liability
may overreach "just compensation" where acts of high-ranking
policymakers are deemed to effect a taking.2a ' A property owner,
therefore, may claim that a regulation or ordinance takes his
property without just compensation, opening the door for a wind-
fall under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.2
Federal courts have been willing to consider the compensation
issue directly pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1331(a) 253 in addition
to 42 U.S.C. section 1983. Qualified immunity has been held not
to apply to municipalities.254
Very simply, a property owner who brings a municipality to
federal court can protect his damage claim in case it is found that
the subject regulation was not enacted in furtherance of the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare. In such a case, a munic-
ipality may not be compelled to pay just compensation under the
fifth amendment because there has been no "taking for public
use," but an actionable claim remains under 42 U.S.C. section
1983 since such a taking may constitute the deprivation of prop-
erty without due process of law under the fourteenth amend-
ment.2 15 Either way, the measure of damages would be measured
by an amount equal to just compensation for the value of the
property during the period of the taking.25 6
2. Procedural Prerequisites-California will have to evaluate
procedural requirements for an action for damages under the tem-
porary taking theory. As a procedural prerequisite, the California
249. The First English Court assumed a taking had occurred, and therefore, never
addressed that issue. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2384. n.7. See also supra notes 240-242
and accompanying text.
250. See Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658
(1978); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985); Pembaur v. City of Cincin-
nati, 106 S. Ct. 1292 (1986).
251. The Pembaur decision states that municipalities may be liable for single actions
of "high-ranking" policymakers.
252. See supra note 114.
253. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) states: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
See also Dahl v. City of Palo Alto, 372 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
254. Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1197 (5th Cir. 1981).
255. San Diego Gas, 101 S. Ct. at 1305 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
256. Hernandez, 643 F.2d at 1200.
[Vol. 24
28
California Western Law Review, Vol. 24 [2015], No. 1, Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol24/iss1/4
REGULATORY TAKING
legislature should amend Government Code section 905.1,257 and
include claim presentation requirements for inverse condemnation
under the California Tort Claims Act.158 This would not be with-
out precedent. Before 1976, there was no doubt that the claim
presentation requirement applied to inverse condemnation ac-
tions.259 Because it was difficult to determine when an inverse con-
demnation action occurred, the California legislature enacted
Gov't Code § 901.1. As a minimum requirement, the California
legislature can exclude from the exemption for claim filing re-
quirements, inverse condemnation action resulting from temporary
regulatory taking facts.
The rationale, of course, is the same as the general purpose of
claim presentation procedure already pronounced.2 60 First, it gives
the governmental entity an opportunity to settle just claims before
suit is brought.26 1 Second, it permits the entity to make an early
investigation of the facts on which the claim is based, thus ena-
bling itself to defend against unjust claims or correct the regula-
tion or practice which gave rise to the claim. 6 2 Third, it allows for
prospective purchasers of real property to make meaningful deci-
sions when buying real property. Conversely, the entity will have
finality added to its regulatory process, lest latent claims be made
by successors in title.
3. Measuring Temporary Damages-The majority opinion in
First English alluded to the difficult task in measuring temporary
damages.26 3 Although analogies to the true eminent domain case
may be useful, they are not entirely applicable. The Court offers
absolutely no guidance on how to handle the dilemma.2 64 For ex-
257. In 1975, the legislature adopted Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. § 426.70(b), which
provides that a cross-complaint in a direct condemnation action need not be preceded by a
claim. In 1976, the legislature abolished the claims requirement for inverse condemnation
actions. If a claim is presented, however, it must be processed in the usual manner. See
City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 509 (1977); Norman E. Matteon
& Henry Veit, Condemnation Practice in California, California Continuing Education of
the Board (Supp. April 1987) § 13.7, at 208-09.
258. CAL. GOVERNMENT CODE § 810 et seq. CAL. CONsT. Art. XI, § 12 provides:
"The Legislature may Prescribe Procedure for presentation, consideration, and enforce-
ment of claims against counties, cites, their officers, agents, or employees."
259. See Mehl v. People ex. rel Dep't of Pub. Works, 13 Cal. 3d 710 (1975), and
Mosesian v. City of Fresno, 28 Cal. App. 3d 493 (1972).
260. Recommendation Relating to Sovereign Immunity, 4 CAL. L. REV'N CO',MM'N
REPORTS 1001, 1008 (1963).
261. See also Knight v. Los Angeles, 26 Cal. 2d 764 (1945); Eaton v. Ventura Port
Dist., 45 Cal. App. 3d 862 (1975); Bozaich v. State, 32 Cal. App. 3d 688 (1973).
262. Id.
263. 107 S. Ct. at 2389 n.10.
264. See, e.g., Comment, "Fair" is Fair: Valuing the Regulatory Taking, 15 U.C.
DAVIs L. REV. 741, 753 (1982).
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ample, when does the taking begin? If the taking occurs when the
ordinance is adopted, that means property owners need to continu-
ally appraise the value of their property to see if there is evidence
that they have been damaged. If a property owner fails to do so,
an estoppel argument in favor of the government may attach. If
the taking occurs when the property owner discovers the devalua-
tion resulting from new regulation, i.e., upon the attempted sale of
his property, then the government cannot protect against stale
claims by using the California Torts Claims Act as a shield. 65
Moreover, how should enhancement be considered in measuring
damages? If a new public improvement enhances the affected
property's value, then the increase attributable to the public im-
provement should offset the amount of just compensation.
These are some of the issues that First English has left for an-
other day. Traditionally, we think of just compensation as the fair
market value of the property interest taken. The concept of tem-
porary damages conjures new valuation problems. For example, in
First English, since there are no facts which support a financial
loss or diminution in value resulting from the subject interim ordi-
nance, assuming the trial court finds that a taking occurred, it is
possible that no damages occurred as a result of the taking.
CONCLUSION
It has taken the Supreme Court a decade to give some indica-
tion of the vague constitutional demands under the regulatory tak-
ing theory. First English gives the illusion of an answer. First
English eliminates the Agins "no compensation" rule and forces
government to bear the cost of improper land-use planning. How-
ever, the converse is also true: First English will have little, if any
effect on governments who engage in responsible land-use regula-
tion. The query remains: Can government effectively regulate
land-use under its police power after First English?
Developers and private property owners might construe the
First English rule as an adequate check on overzealous regulators.
But the "chilling effect" that the First English rule might have on
public officials charged with the responsibility of drafting and im-
plementing regulations designed to protect the public welfare can-
not be measured. Finally, First English raises concerns about in-
creased litigation of taking claims. California must evaluate its
claim presentation requirement and include inverse condemnation
claims in the act's scope to cope with the new litigation incentives
created for property owners in First English. Even under a tempo-
265. See supra notes 257-262 and accompanying text.
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rary regulatory claim, property owners can bring their action in
federal court. However, the problem still remains-valuation of a
temporary taking is highly speculative at the very best and more
likely an impossible task. For these reasons, retrospection allows
us to realize that First English is nothing more than a paper tiger.
Justice Stevens has stated that "the rule of liability created by
the Court in First English is a shortsighted one." "Let's hope that
a broader vision ultimately prevails. '2 6
266. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3164 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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